RECTIFIED DIFFERENTIAL CRYPTANALYSIS OF 16 ROUND PRESENT
RECTIFIED DIFFERENTIAL CRYPTANALYSIS
OF 16 ROUND PRESENT
Manoj Kumar , Pratibha Yadav, Meena Kumari
SAG, DRDO, Metcalfe House, Delhi-110054, India
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we have suggested rectifications in differential cryptanalysis of ultra-lightweight block cipher
PRESENT reduced to 16 rounds. We have shown that proposed differential attack by Wang [3] on 16
round PRESENT can recover at the most 30 subkey bits, although the author has claimed to recover 32 bits
of subkey for last two rounds. We have also computed data complexity and success probability for
recovering 30 subkey bits accordingly by the differential attack on 16 round PRESENT.
KEYWORDS
Lightweight block cipher, differential cryptanalysis, PRESENT
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