RECTIFIED DIFFERENTIAL CRYPTANALYSIS OF 16 ROUND PRESENT

RECTIFIED DIFFERENTIAL CRYPTANALYSIS OF 16 ROUND PRESENT

Manoj Kumar , Pratibha Yadav, Meena Kumari 

SAG, DRDO, Metcalfe House, Delhi-110054, India 


ABSTRACT 

In this paper, we have suggested rectifications in differential cryptanalysis of ultra-lightweight block cipher PRESENT reduced to 16 rounds. We have shown that proposed differential attack by Wang [3] on 16 round PRESENT can recover at the most 30 subkey bits, although the author has claimed to recover 32 bits of subkey for last two rounds. We have also computed data complexity and success probability for recovering 30 subkey bits accordingly by the differential attack on 16 round PRESENT. 

KEYWORDS 

Lightweight block cipher, differential cryptanalysis, PRESENT

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